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The Evolution of Public Sector Bargaining Laws
ABSTRACT
In 1955 only a few states had laws governing collective bargaining by
public employees. By 1984 only a few states were without such laws. The
emergence of these policies coincides with a dramatic increase in unionization
among public employees, and an important puzzle is the direction of causality
between the laws and public employee unionization. A key piece of the
solution is understanding the evolution of the public policy in thisarea, and
this is the focus of the analysis in this study.
A Narkov model of the evolution of these laws is developed based on the
idea that states will change their existing policy if and only if their
preferences deviate from the existing policy by more than the cost of a change
in policy. The key underlying constructs are 1) the intensity of state
preferences for or against public sector collective bargaining and 2) the cost
of changing an existing policy or enacting a new policy. The model is
implemented empirically using state level data on policy for each year from
1955 to1984. The results suggest that state preferences for a pro—bargaining
policy are positively related to 1) the COPE score (a measure of pro—union
congressional voting behavior on labor issues), 2) income per capita, and 3)
the size of the public sector and negatively related to southern region. The
costs of policy change were hypothesized to be a function of structural
measures of the legislative process, but no support for this was found in the
data. Use of the estimates to predict probabilities of states having laws of
various kinds suggests that the model can predict the aggregate distribution
of laws relatively well but that the model does less well at distinguishing







It has been argued that the tremendous increase in collective bargaining
among state and local government employees is largely the result of the
passage of laws by states sanctioning and regulating the process of collective
bargaining by government employees.' In 1955 less than a handful of states
had laws defining the collective bargaining rights of public employees and
virtually all of these prohibited bargaining. By 1984, all but a few states
had adopted a policy in this area, and only a handful of states prohibited
bargaining. Table 1 contains a breakdown of state laws governing the
collective bargaining rights of public sector employees in 1955 and 1984
derived from the the NBER public sector bargaining law data set (Valletta and
Freeman, 1986). While there are serious problems of causal inference in
concluding that the emergence of public policy caused the increase in
unionization, the emergence of public policy in this this area along with
public sector unionization represents an important puzzle for industrial
relations scholars. If the public policy did cause the the increase in
unionization then the problem is to explain the emergence of the public
policy. If unionization (or the pressure for unionization) resulted in public
policy to deal with it then the problem is to explain the emergence of the
unionization.
The ideal would be to specify and estimate a full structural model of
the determination of public sector legislation and unionization that afforded
the opportunity to determine the direction of causality directly. However,
estimation of such a model would strain the limits of the available data and
'Freeman (1986) makes this argument directly in the context of an interesting
survey of the growth of unionism in the public sector. See also the work of
Reid and Kurth (1983), Dalton (1982) ,Noore(1977) ,Ichniowski(1988), and
Lauer (1979)Table 1:
Number of StatesWithLawsGoverning CollectiveBargainingRigs
1955° 1984
No Law Law No Law Law
State Employees 44 4 8 42
Police 45 3 8 42
Teachers 45 3 3 47
°There were only 48 states in 1955.
Source: NBER public sector bargaining law data set. Valletta and Freeman,
1986.2
econometric technique. A difficult, if somewhat less ambitious, task is
undertaken in this study: the specification and estimation of a reduced form
model of the determination of state laws governing public sector bargaining.2
The analysis is reduced form in that the direct effect of public sector
unionization on public policy is not analyzed, and it is argued that the
public policy is a function of the combined sets of factors that affect public
policy indirectly through their effect on public sector unionization as well
as the factors that affect public policy directly.
The empirical analysis relies on the NBER public sector bargaining law
data set (Valletta and Freeman, 1986) which contains information on each
states' laws governing collective bargaining by public sector employees for
each year in the 1955—1984 period. Information is available separately for
laws governing each of five classes of employees (state employees, local
police, fire, teachers, and other local employees). The analysis here deals
with state employees, police, and teachers as groups that are representative
of public employees more generally and capture the important variation in laws
3
across employee groups.While a number of different aspects of each law are
summarized in the data (e.g., collective bargaining rights, union security
provisions, policy regarding strikes, alternative dispute settlement
mechanisms), the analysis focuses on the fundamental policy regarding
collective bargaining rights. This can range from a prohibition on bargaining
to a requirement that public sector employers bargain with their employees.
2Kochan (1973), Faber and Martin (1979), and Saltzman (1985)present studies
of the determinants of public sector bargaining laws.
3
For example, both police and firemen are viewed as critical local government
employees, and the public policy issues raised by unionization of these groups
are similar.3
These data are described more fully in the next section.
In section III a model of the determination of the passage of
legislation governing public sector collective bargaining is developed. This
model describes the process that governs states' decisions regarding 1)
whether or not to enact a law governing public sector bargaining rights, 2)
what type of policy to enact if a law is passed, 3) whether or not to change
an existing policy, and 4) what type of policy to change to if a change is
passed. The model is based on two central constructs. The first is intensity
of preferences for or against public sector unionization and the second is the
cost (ease or difficulty) of enacting or changing public policy in this area.
Essentially, it is argued that a state will enact a policy or change its
existing policy if their preferences differ from the value of the current
policy (or no policy) by enough to outweigh the costs of the change.
The econometric framework is outlined in section IV. A Markov model of
transitions from one category of law to another category (or from no law to a
particular type of law) conditional on the initial category is specified. The
transition probabilities are derived directly from the theoretical framework
developed in section III.
An important part of the estimation of the model is to identify the
factors that influence the intensity of preferences for public sector
unionization and the costs of policy change. Section V contains descriptions
of the explanatory variables used to measure variation in the costs associated
with the legislative process. These include the number of days the state
legislature meets, a measure of general legislative activity, an indicator of
whether or not the legislature and the governorship are controlled by the
same party, and a time trend. Section VI contains descriptions of the
explanatory variables used to measure variation in intensity of preferences.
These include congressional voting records on labor issues, private sector4
unionization, income per capita, the relative size of the government sector, a
time trend, and regional factors. The same set of variables is argued to
measure variation in the value to a state of having no explicit policy.
The empirical results are presented in section VII. The most important
factors found to be influencing the intensity of preferences for public sector
unionization are the congressional voting records, southern region, income per
capita, and the size of the government sector. Nothing measured in this study
is found to influence the costs legislative change in a systematic fashion.
Section VIII contains an investigation of how well the model fits the data.
It is found that the model can explain the overall distribution of laws at
various points in time rather well. However, the model is less successful in
explaining which states have laws of a particular kind at each point in time.
In section IX the results are summarized, and it is concluded that the model
of legislative change developed in this study has some explanatory power but
that more work needs to be done in defining and measuring variables that
affect the costs of legislative change and preferences for public sector
collective bargaining.
II. Des cripionofBargaining Law Data
The National Bureau of Economic Research public sector bargaining law
data set, described in detail by Valletta and Freeman (1986) ,containsa
record of the legislative history of each state's policy regarding public
sector collective bargaining. In constructing these data, a serious attempt
was also made to incorporate policies toward public sector collective
bargaining that originated from judicial decisions. However, because most
existing policy in this area has a legislative foundation and because the
measurement of judicially made policy is likely to be incomplete, the data can5
be thought of as representing a largely legislative history.4 On this basis
the analysis that follows is developed in terms of policy as being derived
through a legislative process.
Overall, these data represent the best available comprehensive source of
quantitative information on policy regarding public sector collective
bargaining. The data are compiled separately for laws covering the three
employee groups focused on here: state employees, police, and school teachers,
and for each group information is collected regarding public policy governing
their collective bargaining rights.
Since it is not possible to characterize parsimoniously the specifics of
every law with respect to collective bargaining rights, the laws are
categorized with regard to their general content. Four types of laws are
defined ranging from the least favorable for bargaining to the most favorable.
The categories are defined in table 2. In the least favorable category,
bargaining is prohibited while in the most favorable category the employer is
obligated to bargain with the union. In the two intermediate categories
bargaining is more—or—less optional.
The evolution of laws governing collective bargaining rights of public
sector employees is quite dramatic. Table 3 contains a breakdown of laws
governing collective bargaining rights by state for each of the three employee
groups in 1955 and 1984. It is clear that in the mid—1950's very few states
had any policy at all regarding collective bargaining rights for public sector
employees, and the laws in those states that did have a policy were not
Incomplete measurement of judicially based policy should be more of a
problem in the early years prior to the passage of legislation because, at
that time, the courts could exercise discretion without reference to specific
legislation.Table 2:
Categories of Laws Govern Collective Bargaining Rights
TY
0 No Legislative Policy
1 Bargaining prohibited
2 Employer permitted but not obligated
to negotiate with union
3 Union has right to present proposals
and/or meet with employer
4 Employer has duty to bargain with
union6
favorable to collective bargaining. By 1984 the large majority of states had
adopted a policy, and these policies were largely favorable to collective
bargaining. For all three employee groups, approximately half of the fifty
states had adopted a policy of requiring employers to bargain with their
employee's unions. While the frequency distributions of type of policy in
1984 are relatively close for the three employee groups, public policy is more
favorable for bargaining on average for teachers than for the other two groups
and somewhat more favorable for police than for state employees. In 1984 more
states had laws requiring bargaining and fewer laws prohibiting bargaining
with teachers than with the other two groups. Similarly, more states had laws
requiring bargaining with police than with state employees.
If we consider each year in a given state to be an opportunity for the
state to modify its public policy, then there are a total of 1490 observations
on the evolutionary process for each of the three employee groups.5 Table 4
contains breakdowns of these processes in the form of cross—tabulations by
employee group of the current year's legislative category by the previous
year's legislative category. What is obvious is that for all groups most of
the 1490 observations are on the diagonals, meaning that there is generally no
change in policy. In fact, of the 1490 opportunities to change policy,
changes occurred only 52 times for state employees, 52 times for police, and
61 times for teachers.
Of the 52 changes in policy regarding state employees, 39 of these were
initial enactments of a policy, 6 of which prohibited bargaining. Of the 13
5There are not 30x50=1500 observations because Alaska and Hawaii did not
become states until 1959 and 1960. Thus, these states do not contribute
observations for the five year period from 1955 to 1959, resulting in ten
fewer observations.Table 3:
Breakdown of laws governing Collective Bargaining Rights by CategoryC
Po Teachers
1955 1984 1955 1984 1955 1984
NoLaw 44 8 45 8 45 3
1 3 8 2 4 2 4
2 1 6 1 9 1 12
3 0 4 0 2 0 1
4 0 24 0 27 0 30
'There are only 48 states in 1955. See Table 2 for category definitions.
Source: NBER public sector bargaining law data set. Valletta and Freeman,
1986.7
6 changes in an existing policy, all involved a change to a more favorable law.
Of the 52 changes in policy regarding police, 40 of these were initial
enactments of a policy, 4 of which prohibited bargaining. Of the 12 changes
in an existing policy, all but one involved a change to a more favorable law.
Of the 61 changes in policy regarding state employees, 45 of these were
initial enactments of a policy, 3 of which prohibited bargaining. Of the 16
changes in an existing policy, all but 2 involved a change to a more favorable
law.
Since most of the "action" is in the initial implementation of a public
policy regarding bargaining, an important focus of the analysis is on the
pattern of emergence of these policies, both across states and over time.
There is also a significant amount of change to existing policy that must be
accounted for. However, the dominant set of observations consists of those
where policy is unchanged, and the theoretical and empirical framework must
be able to accommodate this fact.
III. Theoretical Framework
A simple model of the passage of legislation governing public sector
collective bargaining relies on two factors. First, the intensity of
preferences for or against public sector unionism is an important determinant
both of the passage of any law and the particular type of law passed. Where
preferences in a state are very favorable toward unionization, the state will
be more likely to have a prouniori bargaining law. Similarly, where
preferences in a state are very unfavorable toward unions, the state will be
6For state employees, only Florida firstprohibited bargaining (category 1)
then moved to a policy requiring bargaining (category 4). For police, only
Nevada and Texas had such a reversal of policy. For teachers, only Nevada had
such a reversal of policy.Table 4:
Cross—tabulation of Current Collective Bargaining Policy




0 1 2 3 4
0 748 6 13 8 12
1 0 169 0 0 1
2 0 0 127 1 6
3 0 0 0 96 5




0 1 2 3 4
0 742 4 14 5 17
1 0 89 1 0 2
2 0 1 191 0 5
3 0 0 0 47 3




0 1 2 3 4
0 657 3 18 5 19
1 0 89 2 0 1
2 0 2 233 1 5
3 0 0 0 50 5
4 0 0 0 0 400
°See Table 2 for category definitions.8
more likely to have an anti—union bargaining law. The second factor is the
difficulty of passing legislation independent of the intensity of preferences
for or against unionization. This difficulty level is termed the costs of
enacting legislation, and it is argued to be largely a function of the
structure of the legislative process. A key feature of the model is the
independent nature of the intensity and the costs. Any factors that affect
the difficulty of passing legislation in a way that is related to intensity
are subsumed in the intensity measure.7
Suppose that a law governing the collective bargaining rights of public
sector employees can be characterized along a single dimension and that the
optimal value of a law (intensity of preference) in this dimension is denoted
by R. in state i and year t. A higher value for denotes preferences that
are more favorable toward bargaining. Suppose further that a loss function
L.with regard to collective bargaining policy can be defined simply as the
absolute value of the deviation of the value (V) of the current policy, j,
from the optimal value, R,. This loss function is
(111.1) L.=IR. '.I. ititj
Ifit was costless to enact a policy or change an existing policy then in each
period each state would minimize L. by choosing j such that In other
words, the policy each period would reflect the currently optimal policy.
However, it is generally costly to introduce a new policy or to change an
existing policy due to friction in the political process.
7it is clear that the empiricalanalysis of outcomes will not support any
other interpretation. For example, anything that makes it more likely that a
favorable law is passed cannot be classified unambiguously as more favorable
preferences as opposed to lower costs of passing favorable legislation. The
analogous argument can be made for unfavorable legislation.9
Consider first the case where a state has no policy in place. How will
that state decide whether to introduce policy or to remain without a policy?
Denote the value of no policy by V0.,, so that the loss function evaluated at
no policy is simply
(111.2) L. =IR.
—V . it,OitOit
Ifthe cost of introducing a policy is C.then the state will find it optimal
to introduce a policy only if the loss from introducing the law (C.) is
smaller than the benefit derived from elimination of the loss from no policy.
This condition is
(111.3) IR.—V . >C. itOitit




Notethat this formulation does not impose a particular value to "no
policy" relative to the actual policies. The value of no policy has state
and time subscripts because there is generally a de facto policy implicit in
no official policy that is likely to be state specific and change over time.
For example, no official policy in a generally prounion state will have a
different value than no official policy in a generally antiunion state.
The available data group the laws into the discrete categories defined
in table 2. In order to derive the decision rules for states that have an
existing policy, define V. as the value of a law in category j. Given the
definition of the four categories (excluding no policy) in table 2, it is
natural to assume that V1 <V2 (V3 (V4.
This is not a terribly realistic assumption, and it is not consistent with
the empirical analysis that follows. However, it simplifies the analysis
quite a bit without changing its fundamental nature.Start with #3:
Start with #4:
9Such a retreat is never observed.
interpreted as the point of
category 2, and as long as
by enough to outweigh the cost of
policy. It is not necessarily true
condition holds. This condition
state to desire a change to one of
each of the policy categories are derived
< K —C.or R.) K +C and
R. <K —C. it3it
10
Once a state has a policy in place, it is assumed that this policy can
be maintained costlessly but that a change in policy entails incurring some
level of costs, C., that is independent of the particular policy in place.
In this case a state will decide to change its old policy if and only if the
loss associated with the current policy is greater than the loss associated
with the the best alternative policy plus the cost of change. It is further
assumed that a state cannot retreat to having no explicit policy regarding
public sector collective bargaining once a policy is enacted.9
Using the same notation as above, a state with a category 1 law
(prohibiting bargaining) will want to change that law if
(111.4) R. >K+C. it Iit
whereK1 =(V1+V2)/2.The value can be
indifference (in R) between category 1 and
preferences exceed this indifference point
the change, then the state will change its
that the state will adopt policy 2 if this
is simply necessary and sufficient for the
the other (higher) categories.





R. )K +C it 1 i4..
R<K —C orR >K +C it 1.itit 2it11
where
K1 =(V1-f-V2)/2,
(111.6) K2 =(V2+V)/2, and
K3 =(V3+V4)/2.
If the appropriate inequality conditional on the initial policy is not
satisfied then the state will retain its existing policy. If the appropriate
inequality is satisfied so that the state decides to change its policy, the
state will move to the category that yields the lowest value for the loss
function.
Given that a state decides to enact a new policy or to change its
existing policy, the state will use a similar decision rule in selecting the
optimal category of law. The loss function is minimized by selecting the
category of law whose value is closest to R1. The category of law that
minimizes the loss function is defined by the interval on the real line
delimited by the K1 that R. falls in. For example, the lowest value law
(category 1) will be chosen if < K1 where K1(V1+V2)/2. Similarly, they
will choose category 2 if K1(R.<K2 where K2=(V2+V3)/2. The complete set of
conditions is
Choose 1 if: R. ( K 1. 1
Choose 2 if: K ( R.< K
I it. 2
(111.7)
Choose 3 if: K < R.< K ,and
2 it. 3
Choose 4 if: R,> K
it. 3,
where the breakpoints are defined in equation 111.6.
There are two key features of this model from the standpoint of the
empirical analysis carried out in succeeding sections. First is that the12
model allows the central construct of intensity of preferences (R.) to affect
three important elements of the evolution of public policy regarding
collective bargaining in the public sector:1) the process that determines
whether a state has a policy at all, 2) the process that determines whether
the state adjusts its law to reflect current conditions, and 3) the particular
kind of law that is adopted in an ordered response context. The second key
feature of the model is that the central construct of costs of adjustment
(C.) makes it is possible for changes in policy to be relatively rare events.
This is because the costs of policy change will provide a disincentive to
change policy in response to small changes in preferences.
IV. Econometric Specification
The basic approach taken to the econometric specification is to assume
that there are 1490 (48 states x 30 years ÷ 2 states x 25 years) observations
for each employee group on the current state of policy regarding public sector
collective bargaining rights conditional on the policy that prevailed at the
end of the previous year. Thus, the probabilities of having a particular
policy in a given state—year are specified conditional on the previous policy,
and. these probabilities are used to form a likelihood function that is
maximized with respect to a set of underlying parameters that are common to
the various conditioning events.
The econometric framework used for this task is an extension of a
standard ordered probit model. Conditional on the previous policy (or no
policy) ,thespecification will indicate the probability of the joint event of
1) change or no change in that policy and 2) choice of the particular policy
that was implemented where there was a change. This is essentially a Markov
model of the transition probabilities based on the frequencies in table 4.
The contribution of the theory is that it provides a way to specify each of13
the transition probabilities in this matrix as a function of the same set of
underlying parameters and in terms of a coherent model.
Equations 111.5 —111.7define the decision rules that determine whether
or not a state will enact or change policy and what sort of policy will be
enacted if there is a change. These depend on the values of the cost of
changing policy (C) the intensity of preference (R). the value of no
policy ('1. )' and the threshold values (K1, K2, and K3).
The cost of changing policy (C.) is a fundamentally unmeasurable
quantity that is modeled empirically as the latent variable Y1 for a given
observation where1°
(IV.1) Y1 =X1/31 +&.
The vector represents observable variables that affect the cost of policy
change, is a vector of parameters, and Eisa random component.
Similarly, intensity of preferences (R.) is a fundamentally unobservable
quantity that is modeled empirically as the latent variable Y2 for a given
observation where
(IV.2) y, =x2i3 +e2.
The vector X represents observable variables that affect the intensity of
preferences,2is a vector of parameters, and
2isa random component. A
third underlying construct is the value of no policy (V0.). This is
specified simply as
(IV.3) Y3 =x3133
wherethe vector X represents observable variables that affect the value of
no policy and /33isa vector of parameters. There is no stochastic element in
10The "it" subscripts are suppressed in this presentation, except where
necessary for clarity, to keep the notation uncluttered.14
this construct.
The particular variables in the X vectors are discussed in the next
section. It is assumed that and E have independent standard normal
distributions. Given the qualitative nature of the outcomes, it is not
possible to identify the variances or 2 together with the scale of /3, /3,
and /33. Thus, the variances are normalized to one. The means of C and C2
are normalized to zero because systematic unobservable factors are subsumed
in the constant terms in X1131, X2132, and X3/33. The zero correlation
restriction is imposed for analytical convenience, but it is consistent with
the argument made in section III that the factors affecting intensity of
preferences and costs of policy change are independent by construction.
Given these specifications for the costs of policy change, the intensity
of preferences, and the value of no policy along with the model outlined in
the previous section, it is possible to write the probabilities of all
possible outcomes for each of the conditioning sets (initial policies). Let
J represent the type of law in place in state i in year t. The index can
take on any of the five values 0,1,2,3,4 where 0 represents no policy and 1
through 4 represent the four categories of collective bargaining rights law
described in table 2. These are the five conditioning events that define the
five rows of the Markov transition matrix. The transition probabilities are
defined as
(IV.4) P =Pr(J=! =m)for n,m =1...5 mnt L t—1
where represents the probability that a state with law category m in
year t—1 has law category n in year t. These probabilities sum to one for
each conditioning event such that
4
(IV.5) Vp =1 m =0,1,2,3,4.
n=0
The various P depend on the same set of parameters and are defined in15
11 detail in the Appendix.
It is straightforward to formulate the likelihood function for this
model based on the probabilities for the various events outlined in this




I ln(P mnxt, mn4., =55 i1 m0 n0
whereI is an indicator variable that equals one if state i had law m in mnit
yeart—1 and law n in year t. The variable I equals 0 otherwise.12
mn.I t.
Computation of this likelihood function involves evaluation of nothing more
complex than bivariate normal CDF's, and these are readily computable using
numerical approximations. The empirical analysis consists of maximization of
this likelihood function with respect to the free parameters of the model
•2'3 K1,K2,andIC3).
One shortcoming of the Markov approach used here and implicit in the
likelihood function is that it assumes there is no correlation across time and
within states in the errors and2'It is certainly likely to be true that
there are persistent unmeasured factors that affect the intensity of
preferences and the costs of policy change within states. However,the
appropriate technique for dealing with this problem is not clear. A fixed
effect estimator, which includes a separate intercept for each state (perhaps
While the derivations of the probabilitiesare straightforward, they make
rather tedious reading. The reader may find it useful to examine the
derivation of a few of the probabilities in the appendix in order to be clear
about their nature.
12The variable I = 0 for all values of in and n for Alaska and Hawaii prior mnj.t
to 1960.16
in Y ,Y2,and Y3) imposes too high a computational burden in a nonlinear
model such as this.It also strains the limits of the information in the
data. There are also difficult computational problems in using a random
effects estimator.
While this section in conjunction with the appendix contains much
tedious specification of probabilities, the overall structure of the two
equation model is clear. States will change their policy if their
preference/cost structure changes so that a different policy is optimal net of
the costs of the change. The policy that states will select if they do opt to
change will be the option closest to their most preferred position. In the
next two sections the observable variables that determine the cost of policy
change, the intensity of preference, and the value of no policy are described.
V. The Costs of a Change in Public Policy
The costs of a change in public policy is a construct designed to
capture how difficult it is to make a legislative change in policy. An
important determinant of this is the structural makeup of the state
government. While it is unclear exactly what organizational or political
factors lead to higher or lower difficulty in implementing legislative change,
three measures that are likely to reflect these underlying factors are used in
this study.
The first is the number of days the state legislature is in session.
The argument is that a legislature in session more days has a greater chance
of passing a given piece of legislation. In addition, a legislature that
meets frequently is argued to exhibit more professionalism. It should also be
noted that a number of states had legislative sessions only every other year
or had only perfunctory sessions every other year until recently. It is clear
that these states are unlikely to pass important legislation in the "off"17
years, and a variable representing days in session will capture this
phenomenon. The measure of legislative days was not available for 1983 and
1984, and the 1982 figure for each state was used for these years. The mean
and standard deviation of this variable and the others discussed in this and
the next section are contained in table 5.
The second variable used is the number of bills enacted by the state
government (passed by the legislature and signed by the governor). The
arguments used to justify this variable are similar to those for the number of
days the legislature is in session. The data on number of enactments was
missing for a few observations, and values for these observations were imputed
by interpolation from adjacent years.13
The final legislative structure variable used is a dummy variable that
reflects whether or not the state legislature and the governorship are
controlled by the same party. It is argued that where there is this unified
control, the government will be able to achieve whatever it wants more easily.
This could be favorable or unfavorable bargaining legislation.14
A time trend measured by year is included in the cost function in order
to capture any secular change in the difficulty of legislative change in this
area. One argument for such a change is that as the public sector grew over
this period and/or as public sector workers became more interested in
unionization, the general pressure to articulate some policy with regard to
13
Data for 1955 and 1957 for New Jersey and for 1955 for New York were missing.
14There were nonpartisan elections in Nebraska for the entire period and in
Minnesota for part of the period. Given the absence of a party structure, the
concept of unified control has little meaning so the dummy variable was-
assigned a value of zero in these cases.18
public sector collective bargaining grew. That the pressure is not
particularly for a positive or a negative policy, but simply for some policy,
suggests that this factor belongs in the cost equation where a negative
coefficient would indicate an increase over time in the likelihood of a change
in policy.
VI. Intensity of Preferences for Public Sector Collective Bargaining and the
!LP1cY
Perhapsthe most important factor that would influence a state with
regard to policy toward collective bargaining by public sector employees is
the general attitude toward unions in the state. Three variables are used
here to reflect these attitudes. The first is a measure of the "liberalness"
on labor issues of the congressional delegation of the state. This is likely
to be important to the extent that 1) congressmen reflect the preferences of
the voters in their states on labor issues and 2) these voters elect state
legislators who also reflect these same attitudes. The measure used is the
"COPE score" of the congressional delegation of the state. The Committee on
Political Education (COPE) and the legislative department of the AFL—CIO
regularly tabulate the voting records of individual congressmen on issues of
interest to the labor movement. On each issue, the legislative department
defines a "right" vote and a "wrong" vote where, obviously, a right vote is
favorable to unions and a wrong vote is unfavorable. The COPE score is
calculated as the fraction of votes cast "right" by members of the state'sTable 5:
Desc rip t ion mea and s.d's of Eçpianatory Variables
Mean
Variable (s.d.) Description
COPE .504 Fraction of votes by state's delegation to
(.241) U.S. House of Representatives consistent with
AFL—CIO approved position on issues of
interest to organized labor. Source: AFL—CIO
Department of Legislation, Congressional
Voting Records.
Union .231 Fraction of private sector workforce in state
(.094) unionized. Source: USBLS, Directory of Union
Membership, 1964—80. See text for source
prior to 1964 and after 1980.
South .322 =1 if southern census region
Inc/Pop 3.10 Real income per capita in state in thousands
(.778) of 1967 dollars. Source: U. S. Regional Data
Bank, DRI, inc.
Govexp/Inc .209 Ratio of state and local government
(.0492) expenditures to total income. Source: U. S.
Regional Data Bank, DRI, inc.
Year 69.6 Time trend has values equal to year 55—84.
(8.63)
Legday 115.5 Number of days state legislature met.
(101.6) Source: Book of the States, various years.
Nenact 494.4 Number of legislative enactments by state
(494.1) government. Source: Book of the States,
various years.
Unified .622 =1 if legislature and governorship controlled
by same party. Source: Book of the States,
various years.19
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delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives.
The second measure of the general attitudes toward unions is the extent
of private sector unionization in the state. This may be an important
determinant of the intensity of preferences for public sector bargaining laws
for at least two reasons. First, where the extent of unionization is high
there is also likely to be more general pro-union sentiment. Second, a strong
union movement may be able to lobby more effectively for legislation it wants,
and favorable public sector bargaining legislation is likely to fall mt0 chat
category. It proved very difficult to find a consistent time series or
unionization by state, and what is used is not entirely satisfactory.
Available from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics are state level figures on
union membership for the even years from 1964 through 1980. These data were
interpolated for the odd years to yield a consistent series for these
seventeen years. While other series are available for selected years (e.g.,
Troy and Sheflin (1985) for 1960, 1975, 1980, and 1982) ,theywere not
collected on a basis consistent with the BLS data, so they were not used here.
A series from 1955 through 1963 was derived using data from the BLS on the
aggregate extent of unionization for each year in conjunction with the
state—level data available for 1964. Specifically, the interstate
distribution of unionization was assumed to be the same over the 1955—1963
period as it was in 1964. However, the level in each state was adjusted
proportionally so that the employment weighted average extent of unionization
in each year from 1955 to 1963 agreed with the available annual aggregate BLS
15
The voting records were available only for Congresses (pairs of years) from
1955 through 1958. For these years, the two year record is used. For
example,the 1955—56 COPE score is used for both 1955 and 1956.20
data. In other words, the 1964 state level data were used to fix the relative
unionization across states and the annual aggregate data were used to fix the
overall level of unionization. An analogous technique was used to derive
state level data for 1981—1984 using the 1980 relative unionization across
states and the annual aggregate BLS data.
The third measure of general attitudes toward unionization is a dummy
variable for states that are in the south. While it is well known that
unionization is lower in the south, there may be negative attitudes regarding
unions in the south that go beyond the lower extent of unionization. Evidence
is provided by Farber (1983, 1984) not only that workers in the south are
less interested in unionization than workers outside that region but also that
workers in the south who do want union jobs are less likely to be able to
find union jobs, perhaps for institutional reasons. He also finds that the
existence of right—to—work laws in many states in the south does not account
for this inability to find union jobs.
Three other measures that may be related to the intensity of preferences
for public sector unionization are also used. The first is the level of per
capita income in the state. Where per capita income is higher, it may be that
the citizenry demands more public services and values them more highly so that
public employees have more power that they can use to create an environment
favorable to unionization. Alternatively, the citizenry may view unionization
of public employees as a normal good so they create an environment favorable
to public sector unionization where incomes are high. The precise measure
used is real per capita income in 1967 dollars.
The second measure is designed to reflect the size of the government
sector. Where the government sector is larger, public sector employees are
likely to have more power and influence that they can use to promote
legislation favorable to public sector collective bargaining. The measure21
used is the ratio of state and local government expenditures to income in the
state.
The final measure used is a time trend measured by the year (55—SO).
This measure is included to capture a secular increase in preferences for
public sector unionization. It reflects the hypothesis that the reason for
the implementation of many favorable public sector bargaining laws over this
period is simply a secular improvement in public attitudes regarding public
sector unionization and/or a secular increase in public employees' demands
for unionization.
The value of no explicit policy toward public sector bargaining depends
heavily on the underlying attitudes toward unionization in the state. For
example, attempts to unionize by public sector employees in a state very
hostile to collective bargaining are likely to meet with strong resistance
from employers, the populace, and possibly the courts. The result is a de
facto unfavorable public policy toward unionization. Similarly, attempts to
unionize by public sector employees in a state that is sympathetic to
collective bargaining are likely to meet with less resistance (and perhaps
implicit acceptance) from employers, the populace, and the courts. The result
is a de facto favorable public policy toward unionization. On this basis, the
same set of variables argued to determine the intensity of preference for
unionization are argued to determine the value of no policy.
VII. Results
The econometric specification derived in section IV was estimated by
maximum likelihood using the data from the NBER public sector bargaining law22
data set described in section ii.16 The first panel of table 6 contains the
definitions of three vectors of explanatory variables that are used in the
estimation: 1) Z contains only a constant, 2) Z2contains the full set of
five explanatory variables described in section V for the cost of policy
change, and 3) Z3 contains the full set of seven explanatory variables
described in section VI for the intensity of preference and the value of no
policy.
The second panel of table six contains a summary of eight specifications
(various combinations of the Z's) used to estimate the model for each of the
three employee groups. The first specification is a baseline with only
constants in the three vectors (cost of policy change, intensity of
preference, value of no policy). This model has a total of six parameters:
three constants and three breakpoints. The second specification is fully
unconstrained in that the full set of variables for each of the three vectors
is included: 1) for the cost of policy change vector, 2) for the
intensity of preference vector, and 3) Z3 for the value of no policy vector.
This specification has a total of twenty—two parameters. The next three
specifications in turn have only a constant in one of the three vectors. The
final three specifications have only a constant in two of the three vectors.
The last panel in table 6 contains maximized log—likelihood values for
each of the eight specifications for each of the three employee groups. These
are used to evaluate the various specifications.
Before comparing the different specifications, it is useful to examine
the estimates of the unconstrained model (specification #2).
16The numerical optimization was carried out using the algorithm describedby










°See Table 5 for variable definitions.
Model Specifications
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cost of Policy Change Z2 Z2 Z2 Z1 Z1
Intensity of Preference
Z1 Z3 Z3 Z1 Z3 Z.3 Z1
Value of no Policy
Z1Z Z3
# ofparameters 6 22 16 16 18 10 12 12
Log-Likelihood Values
Emp1oyGroup 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
State Employees —280.0 —250.4 —254.7 —265.8—252.2 —276.6—256.0—266.8
PoU.ce —272.7 —242.9 —247.1 —258.8—243.6 —270.4—247.4—259.5
Teachers —316.3 —270.0 —281.5 —294.2—273.5 —311.0—284.1—296.723
The results are not encouraging with regard to the determinants of the
cost of policy change. For state employees, (table 7a), none of the variables
seem to affect the cost of policy change significantly in the hypothesized
direction. Only the number of bill enacted (nenact) has a coefficient that is
significantly different from zero at conventional levels, and that has the
wrong sign. The results are no better for police or teachers (tables 7b and
7c respectively). Again, none of the variables hypothesized to affect the
cost of policy change have coefficients that are significantly different from
zero in the appropriate direction. In addition, the hypothesis that all of
the coefficients in the cost of policy change vector except the constant term
are zero cannot be rejected using a likelihood—ratio test at any reasonable
level of significance for any of the three employee groups. These tests are
based on comparisons of the log—likelihoods for specification 5 with those for
specification 2. The conclusion is that the set of variables used to
determine the cost of policy change is not appropriate for any of the three
employee groups.
The intensity of preference function performs better. For state
employees, the COPE scores are significantly positively related to preference
while in the south preferences are significantly lower. It is interesting
that after controlling for the COPE scores and for South, the extent of
private sector unionization is not a significant determinant of preference for
public sector collective bargaining for state employees, and it has the wrong
sign. The value of per capita income is marginally significantly positively
related to preference, but the size of the government sector, as proxied by
the ratio of state and local government expenditures to total income, is not
significantly related. There is no significant time trend in preferences.
The estimates of the determinants of intensity are similar but somewhat less
well determined for police and teachers. In all three cases the hypothesis24
that all of the coefficients in the intensity of preference vector except the
constant term are zero can be rejected using a likelihood—ratio test at any
reasonable level of significance. These tests are based on comparisons of the
log—likelihoods for specification 4 with those for specification 2. The
conclusion is that the set of variables used to determine the intensity of
preference has significant explanatory power for all three groups.
The value of no policy function is not very well determined for any of
the three employee groups. None of the estimated coefficients are
significantly different from zero for any of the groups. For both state
employees and police, the hypothesis that all of the coefficients in the value
of no policy vector except the constant term are zero cannot be rejected using
a likelihood—ratio test at any reasonable level of significance. However, for
teachers this hypothesis can be rejected, suggesting that the value of no
policy does vary systematically in the measured dimensions for teachers.
These tests are based on comparisons of the log—likelihoods for specification
3 with those for specification 2. The conclusion is that the set of variables
used to determine the value of no policy has significant explanatory power
only for teachers.
Overall, the estimates in tables 7a through 7c are not terribly
encouraging with regard to the model. It is true that for all three employee
groups the hypothesis that all parameters except the three constant terms and
the three breakpoints are zero (specification 1) can be rejected against
specification 2 at conventional levels of significance using a likelihood
ratio test. However, as is clear from the above discussion, only the
coefficients of the variables determining the intensity of preference are
consistently significantly different from zero as a group. In no case are the
parameters of the cost of policy change function significantly different from
zero, and only for teachers are the parameters of the value of no policyTABLE7a
Narkov Model of Public Sector1Bargaining Laws
State Employees
Cost of Policy Intensity of Value of
Change Preference No Policy
Constant 3.60 Constant 3.60 7.54
(2.28) (4.09) (4.31)
Legday .000298 COPE 2.50 —1.55
(.00137) (1.16) (1.25)
Nenact .000695 Union —4.95 6.89
(.000244) (3.80) (4.19)
Unified —.324 South —1.32 .731
(.237) (.661) (.749)
















a!See Table 5 for defianitions and summary statistics of variables. The
specification used is #2 in table 6. The numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
The statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained
model with constants only.(6 parameters)TABLE 7b
Markov Model of Public Stor Bargaining Laws
Police
Cost of Policy Intensity of Value of
Change Preference No Policy
Constant 2.87 Constant 2.69 —5.82
(1.37) (7.87) (.841)
Legday .000686 COPE 2.08 —.889
(.00143) (1.63) (1.71)
Nenact .000112 Union —3.36 3.78
(.000254) (5.36) (5.64)
Unified .00581 South —1.36 1.09
(.00232) (.779) (.829)



















a/See Table 5 for definitions andsummary statistics of variables. The
specification used is 12 in table 6. The numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
The statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained
model with constants only.(6 parameters)TABLE 7c
Markov Model of Public Sector,Bargaining Laws
Teachers a
Cost of Policy Intensity of Value of
Change Preference No Policy
Constant 3.16 Constant 1.47 —5.92
(1.47) (5.08) (5.39)
Legday .00252 COPE 1.76 —.846
(.00150) (1.29) (1.38)
Nenact .0000210 Union —1.29 1.79
(.000292) (3.94) (4.28)
Unified —.0432 South —1.89 1.85
(.194) (.965) (1.02)
















a/See Table 5 for definitions and summary statistics of variables. The
specification used is #2 in table 6. The numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
b/The statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained
model with constants only.(6 parameters)25
function significantly different from zero.
It may be that the estimation of three vectors of parameters for each
group is putting an excessive burden on the data. Using the likelihood values
in table 6 as a guide, more parsimonious specifications for each of employee
groups can be derived. For state employees and police a reasonable
specification has only constants in the cost of policy change and value of no
policy vectors but with the full set of parameters in the intensity of
preference vector. This is specification 7, and it is nested in
specifications 2, 3, and 5. Specification 7 cannot be rejected at
conventional levels against any of these three alternatives for either state
employees or police. For teachers a reasonable specification has only a
constant in the cost of policy change vector but with the full set of
parameters in the cost of policy change and the value of no policy vectors.
This is specification 5, and it is nested in specification 2. As noted above,
specification 5 cannot be rejected against specification 2 at conventional
levels for teachers. On this basis the discussion of results proceeds using
as preferred specifications 7 for state employees and police and 5 for
teachers.
Tables 8a and 8b contain estimates of specification 7 for state
employees and police respectively. It is clear that the restrictions embodied
in these specifications improve the precision of the parameter estimates
considerably. For state employees the estimates suggest that intensity of
preferences are significantly positively related to the COPE score and
negatively related to being in the southern region. In addition, intensity of
preferences is marginally significantly positively related to per capita
income and per capita government expenditures. The results in table 8b are
similar for police. Intensity of preferences are significantly positively
related to the COPE score and marginally significantly negatively related to26
being in the southern region. In addition, intensity of preferences is
significantly positively related to per capita income and marginally
significantly positively related to per capita government expenditures.
Table 8c contains estimates of specification 5 for teachers, and the
results are somewhat weaker with regard to specific parameters. The intensity
of preferences are marginally significantly positively related to the COPE
score and significantly negatively related to being in the southern region.
However, the coefficients of per capita income and per capita government
expenditures in the intensity of preference equation are small relative to
their standard errors. The value of no policy is significantly positively
related to union status and significantly negatively related to being in the
southern region. However, the remainder of the estimated coefficients are
small relative to their standard errors.
The estimates presented in this section do not provide strong support
for the model. The cost of policy change, while it may be an important
concept, it not measured adequately by the variables used here. Similarly,
variation in the value of no policy is not explained by the data. The only
systematic relationships are found for the variables that determine the
intensity of preferences. In particular, states with high COPE scores and
states outside the south have preferences that are more pro—bargaining.
However, there is no evidence that state/years with a high level of private
sector unionization, after controlling for COPE scores and the other measures,
are significantly different in their preference for public sector bargaining
laws. There is weaker evidence that state/years with higher levels of per
capita income and per capita government expenditure are more favorably
disposed toward public sector collective bargaining.TABLE 8a
Markov Model of Public Secto Bargaining Laws
State Employeesa
Cost of Policy Intensity of Value of
Change Preference No Policy

























a!See Table 5 for definitions and summary statistics of variables. The
specification used is #7 in table 6. The numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
The 2 statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained
model with constants only.(6 parameters)TABLE 8b
Markov Model of Public Sect?r Bargaining Laws
Policea
Cost of Policy Intensity of Value of
Change Preference No Policy


























a!See Table 5 for definitions and summary statistics of variables. The
specification used is #7 in table 6. The numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
bf
The statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained
model with constants only.(6 parameters)TABLE 8c
Markov Model of Public Secto,Bargaining Laws
Teachers
Cost of Policy Intensity of Value of
Change Preference No Policy
Constant 3.23 Constant 1.60 —6.02
(.151) (5.00) (5.31)
Legday COPE 1.67 —.751
(1.29) (1.38)
Nenact Union —1.62 1.94
(3.62) (.396)
Unified South —1.78 1.72
(.778) (.805)


















See Table 5 for definitions and summary statistics of variables.The
specification used is #5 in table 6. The numbers in parentheses are
asymptotic standard errors.
b/The statistic is the likelihood ratio test statistic of a constrained
model with constants only.(6 parameters)27
VIII. How Well Does the Model Fit the Data?
At this point, it is important to ask how well the model fits the data.
While there is no consensus on an appropriate test of goodness—of—fit in a
model such as this, two related concepts are used. The first asks how well
the model can mimic the aggregate distribution of laws by category at five
year intervals. The second asks how well the model can differentiate the
states that have a given category of law from those that do not at five year
intervals.
The parameter estimates for any given specification can be used to
compute a predicted Markov transition matrix for any state i in any year t
using the probabilities defined in the appendix. Denote this one—period
transition matrix by M. whose jkth element is the predicted probability that
state i with law category j in year t—l will have law category k in year t.
On this basis the estimated transition matrix for state i over a n year period
from 1955 to 1955+n is
55+n
(VIII.1) C.=II M. in it t =55
whereII represents the matrix product. The average n—period transition matrix
over in states is
(VIII.2) =. C.
where >representsthe matrix sum. The jkth element of this matrix represents
the average predicted probability that a state with category j law in 1954
will have category k law in year 1955+n.
The average transition matrix was computed for n=4,9,14.19,24,29
(corresponding to the years 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1979, and 1984) for each
of the three employee groups. The preferred specifications were used for each
of the employee groups. These are based on the estimates in tables 8a, 8b and
8c for state employees, police, and teachers respectively. First order28
approximations to the standard errors of the elements of these matrices were
17 computed using the delta method
The first row of the transition matrix, ,containsthe average n
probabilities that a state will have a law in each of the categories in year
1955+n conditional having no law in 1954. Since fewer than a handful of
states had any explicit policy regarding public sector collective bargaining
in 1954, it is appropriate to focus on this row of the matrix. If the model
fits the data well it ought to be true that at each of thefive year intervals
these transition probabilities ought to closely reflect the actual
distribution of laws at that point in time. The underlying conceptual
experiment is to assume that there were no laws in 1954 in any state and to
start the process of evolution of laws according to the estimated Markov
process. The interesting questions regard 1) the extent to which the
estimated Markov process can explain the movements over time in the fraction
of states with a law in a given category and 2) the extent to which by 1984
the cross—sectional distribution implied by the Markov process is similar to
the actual distribution. The average estimated transition probabilities along
with their asymptotic standard errors as well as the actual distribution of
laws for the six selected years are contained in tables 9a, 9b, and 9c for the
three employee groups respectively. The estimated probabilities sum to one by
now.
It is clear from the actual distribution of laws for state employees in
table 9a that most of the action in the enactment of laws was in the period
17The standard error of an element of the transition matrix iscomputed as the
square—root of g'Vg where g is the gradient vector of the particular element
of the matrix with respect to the parameter vector and V is the estimated
asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated parameters. The gradient vector
were computed numerically.29
from 1964 through 1979. This is indicated by the sharp rate of decline over
this period in the proportion of states with no law. The predicted proportion
with no law declined steadily from 1959 to 1984, but the model was not able to
fully capture the steeper decline between 1964 and 1979. The model
consistently overpredicted the fraction of states with category 1 laws
(prohibiting bargaining) after 1964. Roughly speaking, the model predicted
that this fraction remained constant at approximately 7.5 percent after 1964
while the actual distribution stabilized at approximately 15 percent after
1974. At the other extreme, the model did a slightly better job capturing the
emergence of category 4 laws (requiring bargaining). The observed fraction of
states with this type of law increased dramatically from 0 percent in 1964 to
46 percent by 1979. The model did not predict quite so rapid an increase, but
the predicted probabilities of category 4 laws did increase more rapidly over
the 1964 to 1979 period than either earlier or later. The cross—sectional
1984 distribution differs somewhat from the actual distribution in predicting
too high a fraction with no law and too low a fraction with a category 1 law.
Examination of the actual and predicted distribution of laws for police
in table 9b yields similar conclusions to those for state employees though the
model does seem to fit a somewhat better. The timing of the enactment of laws
governing collective bargaining for police was concentrated between 1964 and
1979, and the model was not able to pick this up as well as it might have.
The model did a better job fitting the fairly constant low probability of
having a category 1 law. The model was also able to capture a large share of
the rapid increase in the introduction of category 4 laws between 1964 and
1979. The predicted cross—sectional distribution for 1984 is quite close to
the actual 1984 distribution.
Table 9c contains the actual and predicted distributions for laws
governing teachers. The overall pattern of movement of the actual30
distribution of laws over time is quite similar to the two other groups. The
model fits the data relatively well with the exception (common to the other
two groups) that the rapid decline between 1964 and 1979 in the fraction with
no law is not fully captured by the model. However the relative stability in
the fraction with a category 1 law, the rapid increase in the fraction with a
category 4 law, and the 1984 cross—sectional distribution are all captured
quite closely.
Overall, the model seems to do a reasonable job in explaining the
aggregate distribution of laws at given five year intervals. A more difficult
task for the model is to predict which states have laws of a given type at any
point in time. One way to examine the ability of the model to predict which
states will have laws of a given type is to examine the average predicted
probabilities that a state will have have a law of a given type in a given
year where the average is taken only over states with a law of that type. For
example, it is useful to examine the average predicted probability for states
that have a category 1 law in a given year that those states will, in fact,
have a category 1 law.
The average n—period transition matrix required for this exercise is
defined similarly to that in equation VIII.2 as
(VIII.3) C =. E C. nk in in nk iSnk
where Sk is the set of states with category k law in year 1955+n,kis the
number of elements in S ,andC.is defined in equation VIII.1. The nk in
conceptual experiment is the same as that underlying tables 9a—9c in the sense
that it is assumed that no states have laws in 1954 and that the process of
evolution of laws is governed by the estimated Markov process. If the model
predicted perfectly then the estimated probability that a state with category
jlawin fact has a category jlawwould equal one. The estimated probabilityTable 9a:
Actual and Predicted Distribution of Laws by Category
All Fifty States
State Employees
Year No Law Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Actual .854 .0625 .0417 .0417 0.0
1959
Predicted .849 .0472 .0376 .0284 .0380
(s.e.) (.0379) (.0200) (.0141) (.0123) (.0247)
Actual .740 .0800 .100 .0800 0.0
1964
Predicted .697 .0756 .0703 .0582 .0995
(s.e.) (.0564) (.0318) (.0218) (.0198) (.0445)
Actual .540 .120 .120 .0800 .140
1969
Predicted .539 .0896 .0929 .0858 .193
(s.e.) (.0572) (.0375) (.0273) (.0261) (.0530)
Actual .280 .160 .100 .0800 .380
1974
Predicted .395 .0864 .0996 .103 .317
(s.e.) (.0484) (.0364) (.0304) (.0322) (.0494)
Actual .180 .140 .120 .100 .460
1979
Predicted .288 .0778 .0953 .108 .431
(s.e.) (.0451) (.0337) (.0309) (.0357) (.0492)
Actual .160 .160 .120 .080 .480
1984
Predicted .220 .0712 .0900 .106 .512
(s.e.) (.0497) (.0337) (.0312) (.0369) (.0634)
°Predicted probabilities based on estimates of specification #7 contained in
table 8a. The number in parentheses are estimated asympototic standard
errors.Table 9b:
Actual and Predicted Distribution of Laws by Category°
All Fifty States
Police
Year No Law Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Actual .896 .0625 .0208 .0208 0.0
1959
Predicted .848 .0365 .0523 .0138 .0495
(s.e.) (.0349) (.0180) (.0161) (.00737) (.0269)
Actual .740 .0600 .140 .0400 .0200
1964
Predicted .689 .0581 .0994 .0279 .125
(s.e.) (.0510) (.0270) (.0247) (.0131) (.0458)
Actual .480 .0800 .200 .0400 .200
1969
Predicted .519 .0658 .135 .0410 .238
(s.e.) (.0511) (.0292) (.0321) (.0186) (.0530)
Actual .260 .0400 .160 .0400 .500
1974
Predicted .362 .0576 .151 .0487 .381
(s.e.) (.0434) (.0249) (.0379) (.0227) (.0501)
Actual .180 .0600 .180 .0400 .540
1979
Predicted .248 .0465 .150 .0504 .505
(s.e.) (.0412) (.0207) (.0407) (.0244) (.0533)
Actual .160 .0800 .180 .0400 .540
1984
Predicted .180 .0397 .146 .0496 .585
(s.e.) (.0453) (.0204) (.0425) (.0247) (.0690)
°Predicted probabilities based on estimates of specification #7 contained in
table 8b. The number in parentheses are estimated asympototic standard
errors.Table 9c:
Actual and Predicted Distribution of Laws by Category
All Fifty States
Teachers
Year No Law Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
Actual .896 .0625 .0208 .0208 0.0
1959
Predicted .858 .0367 .0608 .00909 .0375
(s.e.) (.0331) (.0184) (.0203) (.00479) (.0166)
Actual .740 .0600 .120 .0600 .0200
1964
Predicted .685 .0483 .130 .0227 .115
(s.e.) (.0538) (.0231) (.0341) (.0101) (.0381)
Actual .440 .0600 .240 .0800 .180
1969
Predicted .460 .0544 .188 .0381 .259
(s.e.) (.0536) (.0219) (.0452) (.0169) (.0535)
Actual .160 .0400 .200 .0400 .500
1974
Predicted .237 .0592 .213 .0474 .443
(s.e.) (.0421) (.0201) (.0485) (.0227) (.0561)
Actual .0600 .0800 .240 .0200 .600
1979
Predicted .0962 .0697 .209 .0470 .578
(s.e.) (.0337) (.0267) (.0466) (.0242) (.0590)
Actual .0600 .0800 .240 .0200 .600
1984
Predicted .0334 .0836 .202 .0426 639
(s.e.) (.0237) (.0478) (.0484) (.0233) (.0813)
apdid probabilities based on estimates of specification #5 contained in
table 8c. The number in parentheses are estimated asympototic standard
errors.31
that the state has a law in any other category would equal zero. While there
is no chance that the model will do this well, the interesting question that
can be answered by this analysis is whether the estimated probabilities for a
state with a given category law are skewed toward the type of law that the
state, in fact, has.
Tables lOa, lOb, and lOc contain estimated transition probabilities and
standard errors for the three employee groups respectively. The calculations
are presented for the three selected years 1964, 1974, and 1984 (corresponding
to n=9l9,29). Three subsets of states in each year are used: 1) states with
no law, 2) states with category 1 laws, and 3) states with category 4 laws.
The estimated probabilities sum to one by now.
The estimates in table lOa, for laws governing state employees, are not
very encouraging. For states with no law, the estimated probability that the
state, in fact, has no law is substantially different from one even in 1964
and declines dramatically by 1984. Even worse, the estimated probabilities
are virtually indistinguishable from those contained in table 9a computed
using all fifty states. For states with type 1 laws, the model does a bit
better. The estimated probabilities are still dramatically smaller than one,
but they are substantially larger than those contained in table 9a computed
using all fifty states. For states with type 4 laws, the estimated
probabilities are again dramatically smaller than one, and they are again
larger than those contained in table 9a computed using all fifty states.
The results contained in table lOb for laws governing police are
qualitatively identical to those for laws governing state employees. The
model does a poor job distinguishing states that have no law, but it does a
somewhat better job identifying states that have anti—bargaining or
pro—bargaining laws. The estimates contained in table lOc suggest that the
model performs even more poorly for laws governing teachers. The model can32
neither distinguish states that have no law, nor distinguish states that have
anti—bargaining or pro—bargaining laws. Basically, the probabilities
presented in table lOc computed using only the states with specific categories
of laws are not very different at all from the probabilities presented in
table 9c computed using all fifty states.
IX. Conclusions
The character of both the parameter estimates presented in section VII
and. the estimated transition probabilities presented in section VIII lead to
the inescapable conclusion that the model, as estimated, does not adequately
explain the evolution of public sector bargaining laws. However, the model
was successful in some dimensions. A number of variables (COPE scores, South,
per capita income, per capita government expenditures) were found to be
systematically related to the intensity of preferences for public sector
collective bargaining. In addition, the model seems to perform adequately in
explaining the aggregate distribution of bargaining laws at a point in time.
It did particularly well explaining the 1984 cross—section.
On the negative side, virtually nothing was found that was
systematically related to the cost of policy change. Whether this is due to
having chosen the wrong set of variables to explain these costs or this is due
to the concept itself being misguided is difficult to know. However, one
piece of evidence in support of the concept is that when the cost of policy
change is estimated as a constant alone plus a stochastic term, the constant
term is estimated to be significantly different from zero. Were there no
rigidity in policy determination, the estimate of this constant would be
insignificantly different from zero.
Another important negative for the model is its failure to be able to
predict which states (as opposed to how many) had laws of a given category in34
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APPENDIX
Specification of Transition Probabilities
In this appendix, the twenty—five elements of the Narkov transition
matrix are defined. The four elements associated with movement from an
existing policy to no policy are assumed to equal zero by definition. These
are
(A.i) P =Pr(J=OJJ =m) =0 V'm=i,2,3,4. mO t—1
The remaining twenty—one elements are described in the remainder of this
appendix as functions of the latent variables defined in section IV.
Row 1: No preexisting policy (J1=0).
In this case a state will remain without a policy if the absolute value
of the deviation of the intensity of preferences from the value of no policy
is less than the cost of change. In terms of the latent variables, the
probability of this event is




This bivariate normal probability reduces to the product of two univariate
normal CDF's because the correlation of and E— is zero under the
assumption of equal variances for and
The detail of presentation of Pr(J=O!=0) is to illustrate how the
elements of the specification are tied together. This level of detail will
not be continued for all of the probabilities in this section.
When a state with no policy enacts a law in the most unfavorable
category (#1) it is known that the absolute value of the deviation of the
intensity of preferences from the value of no policy is greater than the cost
of change and that intensity of preferences are lower than the bottomAPP-2
threshold (K1). The probability of this event is
(A.3) Pr(J=lIJ1=O) =Pr({Y2—Y3<—Y1 orY2—Y3>Y1], Y2<K1)
which can be expressed as suns of bivariate normal CDF's that are easily
approximated numerically.
When a state with no policy enacts a law in an intermediate category m
(#2 or #3) it is known that the absolute value of the deviation of the
intensity of preferences from the value of no policy is greater than the cost
of change and that intensity of preferences are bounded by the thresholds K1
and K. The probability of this event is
(A.4) Pr(J=mIJ1=O) =Pr(fY2—Y3<—Y1 2Y2_Y3>YiLKmj<Y2<Km)
for m=2,3. Once again, this can be expressed in terms of sums of bivariate
normal CDF's.
Finally, when a state with no policy enacts a law in the highest
category (#4) it is known that the absolute value of the deviation of the
intensity of preferences from the value of no policy is greater than the cost
of change and that intensity of preferences are greater than the threshold K3.
The probability of this event is
(A.5) Pr(J=4J1=O) =Pr([Y2—Y3<—Y1orY2-Y3>Y1], Y2>K3)
which again be expressed in terms of bivariate normal CDF's.
Taken together these probabilities completely specify the likelihood of
all possible events for the cases where there had existed no policy. It is
straightforward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The
parameters of this specification include /3 21f3,and the three thresholds
K1, K2, and K3.
Row 2: A pre—existirig policy in the lowest gr (J=1),
The first possibility is that no change in the law was made. In this
case it is known that the intensity of preferences are not high enough toAPP—3
warrant a change. Specifically, it is known that the intensity of preferences
is less than the bottom threshold plus the cost of making a change. The
probability of this event is
(A.6) Pr(J=1 1=1) =Pr(Y2<K1 +Y).
=
Pr(E2—1<K1—X2/32+X1/31)
which is simply a univariate normal CDF.
While it was relatively rare (see table 4) for a state to change its
policy from one that prohibited bargaining to a more favorable category, it
did happen. If a state were to change its policy from one of prohibiting
bargaining to an intermediate category, in, it would be known that the
intensity of preference exceeded the lower threshold (K1) by more than the
cost of change and that the intensity of preference lay in the appropriate
interval (between K1 and K). The probability of this event is
(A.7) Pr(J=mJ1=l) =Pr(Y2)K1+Y1, K1<Y2<K)
=Pr(Y-Y <-K ,K <Y <K
1 2 1rn—I2 rn
which can be expressed in terms of bivariate normal CDF's.
The final possibility for a state with a policy of prohibiting
bargaining is to enact a policy in the most favorable category (#4, requiring
bargaining). In this case, it would be known that the intensity of preference
exceeded the lower threshold (K1) by more than the cost of change and that the
intensity of preference also exceeded the highest threshold (K3). The
probability of this event is
(A.8) Pr(J=4J1=l) =Pr(Y2>K1+Y1, Y2>K3)
= Pr(Y1—Y2<—K ,Y2 > K3)
which can be expressed in terms of bivariate normal CDF's.
Equations A.6—A.8 define the probabilities of all possible events for
the case where there existed a policy in the lowest category. It is
straightforward to demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. TheAPP—4
parameters of these probabilities include /3 ,2' andthe three thresholds K1
K2 ,andK3. Note that these probabilities are not a function of /33. which
determines the value of no policy.
Row 3: Pre—existing policy in category 2 (J1=2).
The first possibility is that no change in the law was made. In this
case it is known that the intensity of preferences are not high enough or low
enough to warrant a change. More specifically, it is known that the intensity
of preferences is both greater than the lower threshold (K1) minus the cost of
making a change and less than K2 plus the cost of making a change. The
probability of this event is
(A.9) Pr(J=2IJ1=2) =Pr(K1—Y1 (Y2(K24-Y1).
which can be expressed as sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
If a state were to change its policy from category 2 to the lowest
category it would be known that the intensity of preferences was less
than the lower threshold by an amount at least as large as the cost of
change. The probability of this event is
(A.lO) Pr(J=llJ1=2) =Pr(Y2(K1—Y1).
which is simply a univariate normal CDF.
Movement from category 2 to category 3 occurs when the intensity of
preferences exceeds K2 by more than the cost of a policy change and
the intensity of preferences is in the interval from2K to3K. The
probabilityof this event is
(A.ll) Pr(J=3I1=2) =Pr(Y2>K2+Y1,K2Y2K3)
which again can be computed from sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
Finally, if a state were to change its policy from category 2 to the
highest category (#4, requiring bargaining) it would be known that the
intensity of preferences exceeded K7 by more than the cost of a policy changeAPP—5
and that the intensity of preferences was greater than the highest threshold
(K3). The probability of this event is
(A.12) Pr(J.=4IJLl=2) =Pr(Y2>K2+Y,Y>K3).
which can be computed from sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
Equations A.9—A.12 define the probabilities of all possible events for
the case where there existed a category 2 policy. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The parameters of these
probabilities include and the three thresholds K1 ,K2,and K3.
Row 4: Pre—existing pplicy in category 3
The first possibility is that no change in the law was made. In this
case it is known that the intensity of preferences are not high enough or low
enough to warrant a change. More specifically, it is known that the intensity
of preferences is both greater than K2 minus the cost of making a change and
less than the upper threshold (K3) plus the cost of making a change. The
probability of this event is
(A.13) Pr(J.,=3J(,1=3) =Pr(K2—Y1(Y2<K3+Y1).
which can be expressed as sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
If a state were to change its policy from category 3 to the lowest
category it would be known that the intensity of preferences was less than K2
by an amount at least as large as the cost of change and the intensity of
preferences was less than the lowest threshold. The probability of this event
is
(A.14) Pr(J=lIJt1=3) =Pr(Y2<K2—Y1Y2<K1).
which can be expressed as sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
Movement from category 3 to category 2 occurs when the intensity of
preferences is less than K2 by an amount at least as large as the cost of
change and the intensity of preferences is greater than the lowest threshold.APP —6
The probability of this event is
(A..15) Pr(J=2 = Pr(Y2<K2—Y11Y2'K1)
which again can be computed from sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
Finally, if a state were to change its policy from category 3 to the
highest category (#4, requiring bargaining) it would be known that the
intensity of preferences exceeded K3 by more than the cost of a policy change.
The probability of this event is
(A.16) Pr(J(=4IJl=3) =Pr(Y2>K3+Y1).
which is a univariate normal CDF.
Equations A.13—A.16 define the probabilities of all possible events for
the case where there existed a category 3 policy. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The parameters of these
probabilities include andthe three thresholds K1 ,K2,and K3.
Row 5: Pre—existing Polici in the highest categry (3 =4).
Finally, consider the case where the state had a law requiring
bargaining (category #4). While it is conceptually possible for a state to
move to a less favorable policy (if intensity of preference becomes less than
the highest threshold (K3) by more than the cost of change), this was never
observed for the three employee groups over the 30 year period covered (see
table 4). Nonetheless, the probabilities of these events will be required
when the parameter estimates are used to compute predicted legal status at
various points in time.
In the case where there is no change in policy (all of the observed
cases), it is known that the intensity of preferences exceeds the highest
threshold minus the cost of a policy change. This probability is
(A.17) Pr(J=4J1=4) =Pr(Y2>K3—Y1)
which is a univariate normal CDF.APP—7
If the policy were to change to the lowest category it would be known
that the intensity of preferences is less than the highest threshold minus the
cost of a policy change and that the intensity of preferences is less than the
lowest threshold. The probability of this event is
(A.18) Pr(J=1JJ1=4) =Pr(Y2K3—Y1 ,Y2<K1)
which can be evaluated as a bivariate normal CDF.
If the policy were to change to category 2 it would be known that the
intensity of preferences is less than the highest threshold minus the cost of
a policy change and that the intensity of preferences lies between K1 and K2
The probability of this event is
(A.19) Pr(J,=2IJ1=4) =Pr(Y7<K3—Y1,K1(Y2<K2)
which can be evaluated as sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
Finally, if the policy were to change to category 3 it would be known
that the intensity of preferences is less than the highest threshold minus the
cost of a policy change and that the intensity of preferences lies between K2
and K3The probability of this event is
(A.20) Pr(J=3JiJ1=4) =Pr(Y2(K3—Y1 ,K2(Y2(K3)
which can be evaluated as sums of bivariate normal CDF's.
Equations A.17—A.20 define the probabilities of all possible events for
the case where there existed a category 4 policy. It is straightforward to
demonstrate that these probabilities sum to one. The parameters of these
probabilities include2'andthe three thresholds K1, K2, and K3.